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Abstract- The open access, unlicensed or spectrum commons 
approach to managing shared access to RF spectrum offers 
many attractive benefits, especially when implemented in 
conjunction with and as a complement to a regime of market-
based, flexible use, tradable licensed spectrum ([Benkler02], 
[Lehr04], [Werbach03]). However, as a number of critics have 
pointed out, implementing the unlicensed model poses difficult 
challenges that have not been well-addressed yet by commons 
advocates ([Benjam03], [Faulhab05], [Goodman04], 
[Hazlett01]). A successful spectrum commons will not be 
unregulated, but it also need not be command & control by 
another name. This paper seeks to address some of the 
implementation challenges associated with managing a 
spectrum commons. We focus on the minimal set of features 
that we believe a suitable management protocol, etiquette, or 
framework for a spectrum commons will need to incorporate. 
This includes: (1) No transmit only devices; (2) Power 
restrictions; (3) Common channel signaling; (4) Mechanism for 
handling congestion and allocating resources among users/uses 
in times of congestion; (5) Mechanism to support enforcement 
(e.g., established procedures to verify protocol is in 
conformance); (6) Mechanism to support reversibility of 
policy; and (7) Protection for privacy and security. We explain 
why each is necessary, examine their implications for current 
policy, and suggest ways in which they might be implemented. 
We present a framework that suggests a set of design 
principles for the protocols that will govern a successful 
commons management regime. Our design rules lead us to 
conclude that the appropriate Protocols for a Commons will 
need to be more liquid ([Reed05]) than in the past: (1) Market-
based instead of C&C; (2) Decentralized/distributed; and, (3) 
Adaptive and flexible (Anonymous, distributed, decentralized, 
and locally responsive). 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
In recent years, policymakers, academics, and industry 
participants have been debating appropriate models for 
reforming spectrum management regimes to be more 
flexible and responsive to market forces. The debate has 
focused on whether spectrum should be managed via a 
property rights/licensed/exclusive use model or as open 
                                                          
1 Corresponding author: William Lehr (email: 
wlehr@mit.edu) 
access/unlicensed/spectrum commons.2 Proponents of the 
latter model have not adequately explored the mechanisms 
that might be used to manage a spectrum commons. This 
paper attempts to address this gap in the literature by 
considering the range of multi-disciplinary issues 
(regulatory/political, business/economic, and technical) that 
would be involved in managing a spectrum commons (i.e., 
non-exclusive, shared-use spectrum).  
One approach to managing unlicensed spectrum is to 
rely on a technical protocol to allocate and manage shared 
access. Network engineers have designed an array of 
protocols that enable shared access in various wired and 
wireless contexts at different layers of the protocol stack.3  
These offer a variety of trade-offs and reflect the 
perspectives of engineers seeking to solve a diverse set of 
problems. However, the evaluation of alternative protocols 
has taken place largely in technical forums wherein the 
relative merits are evaluated according to engineering 
performance criteria. While this perspective is obviously 
important, it is not sufficient within the context of the 
spectrum reform debate. An appropriate unlicensed 
management framework will need to address non-technical 
policy and business implementation issues as well.  
This paper addresses this need by taking a more 
holistic view of the technical and institutional features of an 
effective management framework for a spectrum commons. 
We focus on shared access to non-exclusive use spectrum 
because we believe this will play an increasingly important 
role in future wireless services. While this may be 
implemented as a public commons, we do not expect the 
"commons" to be an unregulated free-for-all. The 
framework established to manage the "commons" will 
impose restrictions on what devices, uses, or users are 
permitted (i.e., only those that are in compliance with the 
rules). This perspective encompasses such frameworks as 
the current Part 15 devices that operate in the ISM band 
(e.g., WiFi) and (semi-private or private) restricted 
                                                          
2 See, for example, [Benkler02], [FaulFarb02], 
[Hazlett01], [Kolodzy02], [Lehr04], [Ofcom05], [Reed02], 
or [Werbach03].  
3 See, for example, [Peha97], [RoyerToh99]. 
"commons" that may be established in flexible use licensed 
spectrum.  
The goal of spectrum reform is to enhance the 
allocation and use of spectrum so as to foster innovation, 
competition, and the efficient use of spectrum. To be 
consistent with these goals, we argue that an appropriate 
framework for managing unlicensed spectrum ought to 
aspire to be as minimally constraining as possible and still 
be consistent with orderly management of the shared access 
spectrum. We believe better rules are needed for the 
operation of unlicensed devices that would co-exist with 
licensed devices via both secondary use easements 
(underlays or overlays) or as primary uses in dedicated 
unlicensed spectrum. The design of these rules/frameworks 
needs to go beyond the theoretically pure world of polar 
extremes (property rights v. commons) to address the real-
world environment of mixed regimes (both models are in 
use but the bulk of spectrum is allocated via flexible use 
licenses).  
Our "world view" is futuristic in that we speculate 
about an improved (but not ideal) framework for managing 
unlicensed that does not yet exist, and we largely ignore the 
all-important political/business issues associated with 
moving from today's messy status quo (e.g., resolving 
NIMBY issues). In this world, there will be more wireless 
services and products playing an even larger role in our 
lives and global economy. These will be based on a wider-
array of heterogeneous technologies: legacy and new, 
centralized and decentralized, closed and open architectures, 
congestion tolerant and intolerant will all co-exist in the 
market. Radio systems will be smarter (i.e., able to share 
spectrum dynamically), but will fall short of the cognitive 
radio ideal. Importantly, an enduring feature of this world 
will be on-going fundamental uncertainty regarding what 
the high value services will be or the best business models 
and technologies to deliver those services. There will 
continue to be a need to accommodate substantial 
innovation and growth. In this world, there will be an 
increased role for market forces, but there will still be a 
centralized regulator. There will be reduced spectrum 
scarcity, but congestion will still occur. 
In this worldview, rules will be needed, but these can 
be more market-responsive than the traditional command & 
control framework of legacy spectrum management. The 
goal of this paper is to discuss the key features of the rules 
that are likely to be needed to manage a spectrum commons 
effectively. An appropriate framework will promote 
innovation and minimize regulatory distortions. To 
accomplish the latter goal, the regulatory rules should strive 
for technical and market neutrality, while still promoting 
competition where possible. Finally, a good framework 
must be capable of evolution. This includes being able to 
support marginal adjustments between licensed and 
unlicensed, and within unlicensed, to support changing 
protocols without being biased in favor of incumbents or 
entrants.  
Furthermore, we explain why an appropriate 
framework ought to favor distributed/decentralized 
management to the extent feasible in order to realize the 
maximal benefits of a "commons." Finally, we argue that 
the evaluation of management mechanisms for a spectrum 
commons ought to be consistent with the sort of 
environment and the requirements of those sorts of services 
that are most likely to find operation in a spectrum 
commons acceptable in a post-reform world (i.e., one which 
includes command and control, flexible-licensed, and 
commons spectrum). In this world, the commons spectrum 
will be most attractive to applications which are adaptive, 
reasonably tolerant of congestion, but intolerant of the 
higher spectrum opportunity costs associated with using 
licensed spectrum.  
Having established the above, we posit that a suitably 
effective yet minimalist framework will require the 
following types of rules: (1) No transmit only devices; (2) 
Power restrictions; (3) Common channel signaling; (4) 
Mechanism for handling congestion and allocating 
resources among users/uses in times of congestion; (5) 
Mechanism to support enforcement (e.g., established 
procedures to verify protocol is in conformance); (6) 
Mechanism to support reversibility of policy; and (7) Will 
be consistent with security and privacy.  
The balance of this paper is organized into three 
sections. In Section II, we define our terms and establish the 
context within which we expect a spectrum commons to 
operate. Section III then presents our taxonomy for 
evaluating unlicensed management frameworks. Section IV 
concludes with an analysis of certain key issues and 
suggestions for further research. 
2 REGULATORY MODELS AND SHARED 
ACCESS SPECTRUM COMMONS 
2.1 Defining terms 
2.1.1 C&C, Licensed, and Commons 
The debate over spectrum management regimes has 
been complicated by an inconsistent use of terms. Earlier 
discussion often focused on the relative merits of extreme 
theoretical versions of the various regimes, for example, 
comparing pure property rights (fee simple licenses) to pure 
unlicensed (no regulation, free and open access). Critiques 
of unlicensed often failed to recognize that many of the 
benefits ascribed to a property rights regime are also 
realizable in an unlicensed regime ([Lehr04]) and visa versa 
([Faulhab05], [Goodman04]). 
For this paper, there are three models for spectrum 
management that are relevant. The first, corresponding to 
today's status quo may be stylized as Command & Control 
("C&C"). In this regime, market forces have only limited 
impact. A regulatory agency such as the FCC in the US or 
OfCom in the UK acts as a centralized administrator 
responsible for directly managing spectrum use. Under this 
top-down approach, the government controls the choice of 
technology, spectrum uses, and users. Because government 
regulators may lack the expertise to make informed 
decisions, because regulation is often slow and expensive, 
and because it is vulnerable to influence costs, this approach 
is often criticized relative to market-based approaches.4 The 
name, C&C, is intended to conjure images of an inefficient 
Soviet-like bureaucracy.  
In contrast, the two paradigmic alternatives for 
spectrum management are the so-called property rights, 
exclusive flexible use, or licensed ("Licensed") model and 
the so-called open access, unlicensed, or spectrum commons 
("Commons") model.5 Both of these approaches are stylized 
as market-based because decision-making power is 
decentralized to the market. Service providers, equipment 
makers, and end-users interact and compete in the 
marketplace to determine how spectrum is used, subject to 
the regulatory frameworks put in place to govern how the 
market operates.  
Under the Licensed approach, an exclusive use license 
is assigned which may be traded in secondary markets. This 
is often referred to as the "property rights" regime because 
the license confers a property right on the licensee for 
exclusive use of the spectrum.6 The licensee is responsible 
for making all substantive choices as to how the spectrum is 
used. The PCS spectrum in the US provides a good example 
of this regime in practice. PCS licensees have flexibility in 
the choice of technology, services offered, and are allowed 
to trade the usage rights conferred by the license.7 
In contrast, under the Commons approach, the right to 
access or use the spectrum is shared among the users subject 
to a protocol, etiquette, or framework (Protocol) that 
                                                          
4 Much of the delay and cost associated with regulatory 
processes is the result of open access/due process rules that 
are designed to enhance the quality of information shared 
and to protect the process from regulatory capture. 
Standards bodies face the same problems and for the same 
reasons (see, for example, [Lehr92]).  
5 For purposes of paper, we will use Licensed and 
Commons with capital letters as shorthand for the concepts 
as discussed in this paper.  
6 In truth, this nomenclature is unfortunate since all of 
the regimes convey different sets of  property rights. In the 
licensed regime, the licensee has the sole right to determine 
who gets to use the spectrum. In the commons, there is no 
such exclusive right. In the licensed regime, the licensee has 
a property right for interference protection that is 
enforceable by the Courts or by the regulator. In the 
commons, there is no explicit right of protection from 
interference. Any protection is implicit, and a consequence 
of the protocol.  
7 Even PCS spectrum is not  pure "property rights" since 
there are rules which limit tradability and licenses are 
subject to term limits.  
embodies the mechanism for managing the spectrum.8 As 
with the licensed model, the legacy terminology is 
misleading because it suggests a more extreme form of the 
regime than is likely to be either practical or desirable. For 
example, the spectrum will not be "open access" to all, but 
only those who conform with the unlicensed protocol. And, 
"unlicensed" does not mean unregulated. There will need to 
be mechanisms to allocate resources during periods of 
congestion, to recover the costs of management, to 
determine (and potentially modify) the rules that govern the 
Commons, and to enforce compliance with the rules and 
resolve conflicts among users. In contrast to the C&C 
regime where the decision-making authority resides with a 
central planner (the government) or in the licensed regime 
where decision-making authority is decentralized to a 
(presumptively)9 competitive price-based market, in a 
Commons, the decision-making authority is decentralized to 
those who share access to the Commons and is governed by 
the Protocol that is put in place.10  
Furthermore, Commons spectrum cannot be "free" in 
the sense that costs that are incurred need to be borne by 
users (either directly through access payments or indirectly 
through taxes, protocol implementation costs, or congestion-
related quality of service effects).11 These costs include any 
                                                          
8 We will use Protocol with a capital "P" as shorthand to 
refer to the set of rules and mechanism that will instantiate 
the Commons regime. This will likely include "protocols" 
(i.e., running code for a software radio or a technical 
standard), "etiquettes" (i.e., rules for device behavior that 
guide protocol design), or "manners" (i.e. more general 
codes of conduct, as discussed by [Friedman05]). The more 
complete Protocol will also include the regulatory 
mechanisms needed to enforce compliance with the 
governance model.  
9 We say "presumptively," because the efficiency 
benefits of transitioning to a general regime of flexible, 
tradable licenses that rely on market forces instead of 
government regulation presumes that there would be 
competitive secondary markets for spectrum licenses. If this 
is not the case, then at one extreme, the transition from 
direct government "command and control" is simply 
replaced with some form of public utility regulation 
(regulation of a privately-owned monopoly), or at least, 
remains governed by "antitrust." Thus, just as the C&C 
regime is not immune to market forces (e.g., through 
lobbying that reflects market interests), the "market" is 
never wholly free of regulation. Moreover, the feasibility of 
deregulation via market forces depends in part on the extent 
of competition and the robustness of secondary spectrum 
markets (liquidity, low transaction costs, etc.). 
10 The choice of the Protocol may be made by the 
government or by the market via industry standardization.  
11 Ignore case of subsidies (i.e., government pays to 
create open access spectrum and then provides free of use) 
since this is false distinction among models (e.g., licensed 
costs of setting up and operating the management 
mechanisms (processing costs of implementing the sharing 
protocol, enforcement and congestion costs).12 
Several additional distinctions between the Licensed 
and Commons models are worth noting. First, Licensed and 
Commons are both "shared" in the sense that multiple 
devices and end-users simultaneously access and use the 
spectrum. For example, mobile operators share spectrum 
over multiple users, and competition among operators offers 
competition across technologies and markets.13  
Second, Licensed and Commons are both "market-
based" in contrast to C&C. In the licensed regime, the 
spectrum is explicitly priced and traded on secondary 
markets. This allows ready observation of the opportunity 
cost of using spectrum (assuming secondary markets are 
efficient) which provides strong incentives to use spectrum 
efficiently since congestion externalities are internalized and 
helps ensure that scarce spectrum is allocated to higher 
value uses first. In the Commons regime, use of the 
spectrum is governed by the Protocol. However, use is still 
"market-based" in that users respond to private incentives 
(individual utility or profit maximization) to determine how 
they operate in the unlicensed spectrum, constrained by the 
spectrum etiquette. This raises the potential risk of a 
Tragedy of the Commons in which users lack adequate 
incentives to use spectrum efficiently (they are "greedy") 
and spectrum may fail to be allocated to the highest value 
uses ("garbage" uses may crowd out more valuable 
unlicensed users).14 To address this challenge, clever design 
                                                                                                  
spectrum use could be subsidized by licensee because use 
produces other benefits for licensee as would be the case if 
Microsoft or Intel bought licensed spectrum and then 
created a "commons" for  use by Intel or Microsoft devices).  
12 Note, these costs are also borne in licensed regime. 
Some analysts (Faulhaber05) ignore transition costs  
13 In this sense, the Licensed model offers dynamic, 
spectrum access already and movement by end-users via 
roaming and via switching among operators already 
implements dynamic secondary markets. Viewed this way, 
the mobile customers are secondary licensees who get to use 
the spectrum on the basis of the rules established by the 
licensed operators. 
14 That is, individual users do not bear the full cost of the 
negative congestion externality they impose on other users 
and so are inclined to use too much spectrum (e.g., by using 
too high power). Protocols that allow such self-interested 
behavior which results in a Tragedy of the Commons are 
termed "greedy" ([SataPeha00]). An additional problem is 
that when spectrum is scarce, a Commons may fail to 
allocate spectrum efficiently so that lower value uses crowd 
out high value. Such low value uses are termed "garbage" 
uses. However, because markets are often imperfect, one 
must be careful before equating a low ability to pay for 
access to "garbage" use. 
of the Protocol may be used to substitute non-price (e.g., 
performance) incentives to use spectrum efficiently.  
Which approach is better depends on the context and 
the relative scarcity of spectrum. If congestion is not a 
threat, then the opportunity cost will be low in both regimes 
(once again, assuming efficient secondary markets for 
licensed spectrum).15 The relative difference in opportunity 
costs under the two regimes should to induce 
applications/users to self-select so that users willing to pay 
more for strong interference protection will choose to locate 
in licensed spectrum, while users that are unwilling to pay 
for such protection will choose to locate in unlicensed 
spectrum. The latter will include both applications that are 
robust to interference (e.g., because the applications/devices 
are adaptive) and low value uses "garbage" uses.  
Third, a key difference between Licensed and 
Commons spectrum is associated with the right to exclude. 
In Licensed, the right to exclude belongs to the licensee and 
so is centralized. Whereas, in the Commons, the right to 
exclude other uses is shared, and so decentralized.  
This characterization of the regulatory models 
presented above is stylized in that it mischaracterizes the 
complexity of the status quo regime. The actual situation 
differs significantly from C&C. Different bands are subject 
to different regulatory regimes. Some like PCS spectrum, 
allow significant latitude for technology choice and trading 
of licenses, coming closest to the ideal of the Licensed 
model in the current environment. Other spectrum like the 
television broadcast or much government spectrum remains 
encumbered with legacy regulations and more nearly 
reflects the C&C model as described. A version of the 
Commons exists in the form of the "Part 15" rules which 
govern the operation of low power unlicensed devices in the 
ISM and U-NII bands.16 The Part 15 rules specify the 
operating parameters for low power unlicensed devices. The 
Part 15 rules seek to limit the interference caused by such 
devices for other users while seriously circumscribing the 
                                                          
15 If secondary markets are not efficient either because 
of market power or because of high transaction costs (thin 
markets, information asymmetries, regulatory costs), then 
the price for licensed spectrum may be substantially above 
the economic value of the spectrum. The existence of 
unlicensed spectrum provides a safety valve and check to 
help keep the prices for licensed spectrum in line with the 
scarcity value of spectrum.  
16 This refers to the relevant section of the U.S. 
Communications Law that governs the use of unlicensed 
devices (see 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_02/47cfr15_02.
html for Title 47 Code of Federal Regulations Part 15, 
47CFR15). The Industrial, Science and Medical (ISM) and 
the Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure (U-NII) 
bands include spectrum in the 900Mhz, 2.4GHz, and 5GHz 
bands in which cordless phones, garage openers, and 
WLAN devices (802.11a/b) devices operate. 
interference protection granted to unlicensed devices. The 
FCC regulates compliance via the certification of devices 
(radios). 
The characterization of the status quo as C&C is 
intended to highlight the benefits of further spectrum 
reform. These benefits will include increased reliance on 
market forces to allow spectrum to be more flexibly 
reallocated to new uses and users. This enhanced efficiency 
both in a static (spectrum goes to highest value uses) and 
dynamic (new technologies can be deployed) sense will 
reduce artificial scarcity (regulatory induced). This artificial 
scarcity distorts opportunity costs and hence adversely 
impacts innovation, investment, and competition. Figure 1 
summarizes how the three regulatory models are related. 
Figure 1: Spectrum Reform 
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 Collective choice of rules: 
standards/protocol (or government?)
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secondary markets
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Finally, it is worth noting that spectrum management 
involves several layers of activity or aspects that might be 
logically disaggregated. This might make it feasible to apply 
different management regimes for different aspects. For 
example, we might view spectrum management broadly as 
addressing three categories of issues: (1) structure of 
authority to determine the rules; (2) structure of rights 
ownership; and (3) the structure of communication (market 
mechanism) to transfer authority, ownership and usage 
(delegation). As in other areas of regulation, the extent of 
centralized, hierarchical control may differ. For example, 
the distributed control of a Commons may be more 
appropriate for enabling low overhead communications (the 
third aspect), while a degree of centralized control may 
simplify management of the rules (e.g., like the management 
of the address space and domain level identifiers in the 
Internet).  
2.1.2 Flavors of Unlicensed 
There are three basic approaches for allowing 
unlicensed devices to operate that are under discussion 
currently. These are: (1) underlays, (2) overlays, and (3) 
dedicated unlicensed. 
A spectrum underlay is a secondary easement for low-
power devices that allows devices to operate in the noise 
floor of the primary, licensed spectrum user. The Part 15 
rules provide one model for how such an underlay might be 
implemented. The current debate over underlays has 
focused on Ultrawideband (UWB) technologies that would 
use code-division-multiplexing to spread signals over a very 
wide frequency band and thereby allow much lower power 
operation per bit of information transmitted.  
Similarly, a spectrum overlay is a secondary easement 
that allows opportunistic use of licensed spectrum that does 
not interfere with the primary operators use (e.g., in time 
slots or geographic locations where the primary spectrum is 
not in use). The "listen-before-talk" protocol mandated for 
use in U-PCS spectrum is an example of an "overlay" 
approach to managing unlicensed devices. The current 
debate over overlays focuses on the potential for smart or 
"Cognitive Radios" to dynamically adjust their behavior to 
efficiently share spectrum. 
Finally, dedicated unlicensed spectrum would be 
spectrum that treated all unlicensed devices as primary 
users. From a practical sense, the focus of unlicensed use is 
on permitting decentralized coordination and so an effective 
Protocol for managing a Commons would entail the same 
sort of functionality as an overlay. Additionally, because (as 
we explain further below), the power for devices operating 
in the common is likely to be quite limited and  because 
there is very little spectrum that might be available that 
would have no incumbency rights to address (e.g., satellite 
downlinks which might be regarded by policymakers as 
"primary" users), a Commons may look a lot like an 
underlay in the first instance (limited power), and an overlay 
in the second (ability to yield or be pre-empted by certain 
"primary" uses). 
For the purposes of designing a suitable Protocol, it 
may not really matter whether one thinks of the unlicensed 
devices as operating in an underlay, overlay, or dedicated 
spectrum; however, we will focus on the last model because 
we believe that the politically-practical limits on 
implementing effective underlays (power limits) or overlays 
(cognitive radios) will be sufficiently severe as to hamper 
realization of the full benefits and applicability of the 
unlicensed models. For example, the power limits for UWB 
are quite stringent, which may limit the applicability of this 
promising technology to quite short range uses (e.g., a few 
tens of feet to serve as wireless "USB" replacement). 
Moreover, operating in an underlay or an overlay if used 
intensively, is likely to result in some interference for 
primary users unless guard bands are sufficiently stringent, 
in which case, the effective spectrum available will be even 
less. However, if it is feasible to allow sufficiently robust 
(but still limited) power and primary (incumbency/licensed) 
rights are adequately circumscribed in the spectrum 
assigned to the Commons, than the choice of unlicensed 
flavor will be less important.17  
                                                          
17 [FaulFarb02] recommended the use of 
underlays/overlays to reconcile the coexistence of licensed 
(property rights) and unlicensed (commons) models. 
[Lehr04] explains why this may be less attractive than using 
In summary, therefore, a spectrum Commons enables: 
• (1) Shared use (multiple devices with 
heterogeneous technologies and apps share 
spectrum access – multiplicity of power levels, 
bandwidth requirements, and duration); which is  
• (3) non-exclusive use (control of access is 
decentralized to etiquette, there is no central-
planner who manages access) that is managed as a  
• (3) Commons (management control, including 
decision-making authority over etiquette is 
decentralized). It is  
• (4) unlicensed because we presume that 
devices/users do not need to first pay for or 
otherwise acquire rights to access/use the spectrum. 
Instead, any device that adheres to the etiquette 
(and is therefore "conforming") is  
• (5) free to use the spectrum.18  
2.1.3 Relationship to Ad hoc networking 
The significant progress in wireless technology and the 
growth of wireless services has provided the principal 
impetus for reforming spectrum management and the 
transition toward increased reliance on market forces. While 
many wireless technologies contribute to both the viability 
and desirability for managing spectrum via unlicensed 
(smart wireless system technology including 
software/cognitive radios, smart antennas, and MIMO), the 
benefits of unlicensed wireless are perhaps best anticipated 
in the context of "ad hoc" networks. Some of the key 
features that characterize "ad hoc" network environments 
include ([MackCor99]): 
• (1) Mobile devices (moving autonomously). There 
is no central controller.  
• (2) Energy conservation is a major concern since 
devices are likely battery powered. Devices are low 
powered so range-limited.  
• (3) Multi-hop routing with most devices acting as 
both receivers and transmitters. This is a direct 
result of the fact that nodes are low powered and so 
wide-area communications requires multi-hop 
operation. This also turns out to be efficient 
([XieKumar04]). 
• (4) Random distribution of devices. Beyond 
density, very little a priori structure may be 
assumed for network topology. This results in 
difficult dynamic routing problem.  
                                                                                                  
dedicated spectrum to address the needs of unlicensed 
devices.  
18 The etiquette may require a payment (e.g., a license 
fee to use the technology) to allow recovery of spectrum 
management costs or other costs (transition costs associated 
with spectrum clearing).  
• (5) Limited a priori knowledge of who is 
participating in network (new devices may 
enter/leave at will). Makes it difficult to generate 
reputation effects. 
• (6) Distributed/decentralized network management. 
There is a lack of or lack of a requirement for a 
centralized controller. 
These features have a number of important 
technical/business implications for protocol design.  First, in 
ad hoc networks there is a need to generate incentives to 
cooperate. The nodes need to cooperate to support multi-hop 
routing because of their limited range (power). This is 
challenging because acting as a repeater for other users 
traffic consumes power and so is privately costly.  
Second, the randomness of the nodes participation and 
network topology provides limited opportunities for long-
term contracting among devices to manage sharing. This  
may reduce the ability to rely on repeated game reputation 
effects to induce cooperative/efficient behavior.19 By 
analogy, the transactions among ad hoc nodes are more like 
what happens in anonymous arms-length trade than what 
happens in a firm that is under centralized management 
(which is like the Licensed regime). This suggests that 
protocols that use price-based mechanisms may offer more 
fruitful approaches for inducing cooperation. In order to 
avoid the transaction costs of using actual money (i.e., 
billing) which are unlikely to be warranted given the relative 
value of the services provided in each transaction (i.e., 
forwarding another node's bits), the protocol may be based 
on notional prices that reward repeating with sending 
rights.20  
Third, the need to keep track of distributed resources 
makes implementing traditional MAC approaches such as 
time (TDMA), frequency (FDMA), or code (CDMA) 
multiple access difficult. The mobility of the nodes, their 
limited resources, and the dynamism of the communications 
environment means that link-level and network-level 
reliability issues are an enduring challenge and necessitates 
multi-layered protocol design (see, [Kawad04]). 
Fourth, the limited information that may be assumed 
about nodes location, behavior, and even identity (to protect 
privacy) imposes limits on the interference models that may 
be implemented. The nodes must respond to local 
information and information gleaned from adherence to the 
"protocol" to determine whether interference or 
communication problems they are experiencing are due to 
congestion,  local factors, or other wider-area factors.  
                                                          
19 In any case, relying on reputation effects to generate 
incentives to cooperate may raise privacy concerns. This is 
another potential advantage of the anonymity inherent in 
using a notional price-based approach. 
20 See [Crow03] for how such a price-based protocol 
might be implemented to generate cooperation incentives in 
an ad hoc network.  
Fifth, the unpredictable entry/exit of nodes and of 
traffic patterns that makes ad hoc networks so dynamic 
provides a good test case for unlicensed use because it 
mirrors the process of innovation and entry/exit and the 
complexity of heterogeneous flexible uses that characterizes 
a competitive, dynamic wireless industry and is consistent 
with our view of the wireless future. Ad hoc networks 
present the most demanding challenge for supporting 
unlicensed use. Many of the uses of unlicensed that we 
actually expect to see will not fit the ad hoc model (e.g., 
fixed wireless broadband access or in-home broadband 
wireless). However, a regulatory framework that is robust to 
the deployment of ad hoc network technology will hopefully 
be robust to other innovations. In effect, ad hoc networking 
is the "Canary in the Mine" against which to evaluate 
unlicensed protocols.  
Sixth, while Ad Hoc networks pose a challenge for 
dynamic routing and the design of management 
mechanisms, their decentralized/distributed nature may 
offer robustness benefits. With ad hoc networks there is no 
single point of failure. Contrast this with the vulnerability of 
a hierarchical telecom network which relies on a centralized 
signaling framework such as Signalling System 7 (SS7). 
This is not to say that this makes ad hoc networks more 
reliable than traditional hierarchical, centralized networks 
(which may benefit from redundant facilities and quick 
recovery mechanisms), but rather that they offer a different 
kind of robustness and reliability. A world with "Carrier 
grade" telecom networks offering "five 9's reliability"21 and 
ad hoc networks is likely to offer improved reliability over 
one with only one kind of network.  
Seventh, and finally, the unpredictability inherent in ad 
hoc network management makes it difficult to know who 
will participate and what they will want to do. When these 
situations prevail in a macro market, it makes it difficult to 
develop a retail business model or to plan infrastructure. 
When you cannot do these things, it makes it difficult to 
raise financing. Such market situations may be best 
addressed by flexible and scalable business models, 
characterized by distributed experimentation and loose 
organizational structures. That is, "ad hoc" business/service 
models. These business models are at a disadvantage 
relative to the traditional service provider model when it 
comes to being able to assemble the resources to acquire 
access to licensed spectrum. For example, the traditional 
service provider model involves capital-intensive network 
infrastructure and retail operations. Such investments may 
require stronger interference protection because of the scale 
of investment that is at risk and may be co-specialized with 
a particular frequency (although with smart radio systems, 
this level of co-specialization is decreasing). Therefore, we 
might expect service providers to be biased in favor of 
licensed spectrum. While this is an important model for 
                                                          
21 The standard for modern telecommunication networks 
is to offer 99.999% availability. 
deploying wireless services, it is certainly not the only 
business model or type of service environment that needs to 
be provided for to encourage a vigorous wireless future. 
2.2 Characteristics of good mechanism 
Before proposing a framework for evaluating 
alternative management protocols for shared, non-exclusive 
use spectrum, it is worthwhile considering the goals that a 
desirable system ought to promote, and to that, it is 
necessary to comment on the type of environment that is 
likely to prevail. 
2.2.1 Features of future "unlicensed" environment 
To provide additional context for evaluating potential 
protocols for managing unlicensed spectrum, there are 
additional features that are likely to characterize the 
unlicensed wireless environment. These include:  
2.2.1.1 Heterogeneous devices and uses.  
We should assume that the traffic may be bursty with 
heavy-tailed distributions. It will vary in  duration, 
bandwidth, and power/range requirements for end-to-end 
communications. An ideal framework would allow as many 
types of traffic to co-exist as possible, but it may prove 
necessary to deviate from this ideal. One option is to think 
about designing separate commons for different classes of 
applications (e.g, a low power commons for mesh 
applications v. a higher power commons for multiple classes 
of applications). However, even if the Protocol does impose 
some limits on the classes of applications that are admitted, 
the class should be as broad as possible. 
2.2.1.2 Lots of potential operators and devices.  
Although the number of potential users should be 
large, it is not unlimited. An oft-heard critique of commons 
management regimes is that decision-making does not scale 
to large numbers.22 Fortunately, the relatively low power 
operation will likely bound the number of devices that need 
to be coordinated. Precisely what this bound might be is 
uncertain but it might be quite large. 
2.2.1.3 Relatively abundant spectrum. 
In the future we have described, radio systems will be 
more efficient and regulatory reform will have eliminated 
most of the artificial scarcity due to inefficient legacy 
regulations. This does not mean that the opportunity cost for 
using spectrum will be zero (no scarcity), but only that the 
marginal value of any particular frequency band in any 
particular locale will be much lower than is suggested by an 
analysis of historic spectrum auction data or wireless asset 
                                                          
22 For example, the social norms that coordinate 
cooperation in resources that are managed as a commons in 
other contexts (common pasture, fisheries) depend on group 
cohesiveness. As the group or scale of economic activity 
gets large, a market-based process based on property rights 
to manage the resources may become preferable (see 
[Demsetz02]).  
transactions. Because such data are embedded in most 
business model forecasts used to estimate the marginal 
value of spectrum, these estimates likely are systematically 
biased upward. Moreover, because unlicensed applications 
are relatively new, such analyses are biased to value 
licensed spectrum significantly more than unlicensed. To 
the extent the social value of unlicensed is associated with 
innovation,23 failure to incorporate this value into spectrum 
calculations when estimating what the appropriate allocation 
should be between licensed and unlicensed spectrum is 
biased in favor of licensed.  
If we assume that spectrum will be relatively abundant, 
then the marginal value of improvements in spectral 
efficiency over other characteristics that might be important 
in a good Protocol will be less. When comparing two 
protocols it would be worthwhile considering which would 
be preferred if there was no scarcity (i.e., mutual use may be 
a positive sum game). Note that this is not the same as 
saying that the probability of interference is zero. Even if 
traffic is relatively sparse, unless it is coordinated, nodes 
may interfere with each other unnecessarily. However, the 
need to sort high value from low value uses would no longer 
arise and incentives to cooperate may be stronger. In 
contrast, in a licensed regime with zero scarcity the market 
price for spectrum might be sufficiently close to zero to be 
below the transaction costs that would be incurred by a 
seller to make it available to a buyer, so efficient use might 
be deterred in a licensed regime if scarcity is sufficiently 
low.  
For example, it may be the case that a successful 
Commons protocol, as a first approximation, may assume 
that devices do not want to be "greedy" except out of 
ignorance and that there are no "garbage" applications. This 
does not avoid the need to incorporate the capability to 
address such circumstances when they arise, but it does 
increase the tolerance for relatively inefficient mechanisms 
when those are used infrequently.  
Moreover, the assumption of relative spectrum 
abundance for unlicensed is also supported because we 
assume that there will be both licensed and unlicensed 
spectrum, which will encourage applications to self-sort on 
the basis of their relative demands for strong interference 
protection. Thus, devices that are relatively interference 
tolerant will be more likely to locate in unlicensed spectrum. 
And, even intolerant applications will find locating in 
unlicensed acceptable if the prospect of congestion is 
sufficiently low (e.g., in rural areas). 
2.2.2 Future is shared spectrum 
The above factors, and the nature of "ad hoc" networks 
suggest a future where the spectrum is heavily shared, not 
just among multiple users but by multiple uses and 
operators (see Figure 2). The increased capabilities of smart 
                                                          
23 See [Odlyzko04] for discussion of role of unlicensed 
in promoting innovation in telecom services.  
radio systems have expanded the space of wireless 
architectures, making it possible for many very different 
architectures to support similar services (e.g., centralized 
and decentralized architectures are both options) and to 
decouple services from specific frequency bands. Customer 
expectations are also pushing us toward a world of 
heterogeneous, mixed networks. Customers want 24/7, 
ubiquitously available services, and do not care what the 
technical platform is that supports those services. They just 
want it to work. Moreover, with the transition to broadband, 
user traffic will become more bursty and heterogeneous. 
Regulatory reform and industry dynamics are increasing 
competition all across the value chain (e.g., wired and 
wireless broadband are nearer substitutes). This encourages 
operators and businesses to try and decouple infrastructure 
from spectrum and investment. An operator whose service is 
locked into a specific frequency band or can only provide 
service over a single platform will be at a disadvantage 
relative to more flexible operators. Just as mobile operators 
are now seeking ways to integrate 3G services with WiFi, so 
they will seek to be able to integrate other technologies.24 
As applications become more robust to operating across 
heterogeneous platforms, equipment makers and service 
providers will find it more advantageous to support such 
frequency/architecture flexibility.  
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When evaluating Commons management regimes, it is 
worthwhile having some concrete ideas of the sorts of 
business models/applications that may need to be supported 
in unlicensed spectrum. A good Protocol ought to support as 
many of these as possible. Several possible scenarios for 
unlicensed use that should be considered include: 
2.2.2.1 WiFi model of unlicensed device use 
In this scenario, mass market consumers deploy new 
wireless devices in a viral manner, without central 
coordination of use. For example, the deployment of 
                                                          
24 See [LehrMcK03] for a discussion of integration of 
WiFi and 3G. 
Bluetooth and potentially UWB in home appliances could 
follow such a model. Once such devices are widely 
deployed, it is reasonable to expect that someone might 
develop the applications or middleware to tie these together 
into larger networks (e.g., wireless grids).  
2.2.2.2 Mobile operators sharing 3G spectrum 
Today, spectrum licenses to provide mobile services 
provide an entry barrier that gives incumbent licensees a 
strategic advantage. However, with robust competition and 
the threat of increased allocations for competing wireless 
technologies on the one hand and the prospect of having to 
pay to acquire licenses for additional spectrum in order to 
support new 3G wireless broadband services on the other, 
mobile operators may be more inclined to share spectrum. 
The value of holding an exclusive license to a particular 
frequency band is diminished in the world we have 
described above. With bursty, wireless broadband traffic, it 
will be more efficient for mobile operators to dynamically 
share spectrum than for each of them to have to provision 
sufficient spectrum to support their peak bandwidth needs. 
The technologies to share such spectrum are becoming more 
readily available.  
In such a world of agile infrastructure, providers may 
care less which spectrum they own and more about  
ensuring that no one else has a right to exclude them. 
Collective ownership of the 3G spectrum and management 
of it as a closed common (i.e., for qualified service 
operators) may offer an efficient management regime. Of 
course, were the operators to attempt such a structure, they 
might raise antitrust concerns. To forestall that, the 
operators might make the spectrum "open access" under the 
management of an industry-defined protocol. A similar 
approach is used to justify the openness of Internet peering 
arrangements (i.e., anyone can peer who meets the capacity 
requirements, but those are set so as to practically restrict 
the number of potential peering partners).  
2.2.2.3 Community last-mile networks 
In a future with lots of deep neighborhood fiber (FTTx 
where x may be the curb, block, building, etc.), wireless 
may play an important role in providing connectivity over 
the last few tens of feet to the home. If the FTTx is deployed 
by a large national service provider like a telephone or cable 
company, then they may find it practical and not difficult to 
acquire licensed spectrum. However, in other situations, 
communities may wish to deploy their own last-mile 
infrastructure. While not appropriate in all contexts, 
municipal networking is likely to be an increasingly 
common feature of the future broadband landscape, and 
wireless will play a big role in that. 
Municipalities may prefer to locate in unlicensed 
spectrum because of the reduced transaction costs and their 
bias in favor of capital/equipment instead of service-
provider models. That is, municipalities are typically 
relatively ill-equipped to operate retail services, but may 
have certain advantages in financing the deployment of 
long-lived, "natural monopoly"-like infrastructure.25 If used 
to support basic infrastructure, the municipalities may desire 
strong interference protection to protect the value of their 
local infrastructure and to minimize the need to address 
interference-related issues. The efforts of WISPs to gain 
special interference protection for their wireless broadband 
services deployed in unlicensed spectrum provides insight 
into how this might work. Alternatively, municipalities may 
be inclined to share their public safety spectrum if 
appropriate sharing mechanisms can be devised.  
2.2.2.4 Mesh networks 
A final example to consider is the case where there is a 
desire to deploy a large mesh network. This might arise in 
the context of an emergency (flood, hurricane) or special 
event (conference, festival). The proto-typical situation 
would be one in which it was desired to set up a mesh 
network very quickly to cover a campus-sized or larger area. 
Alternatively, the mesh might be a large ad hoc network. 
Possible examples might include a taxicab dispatch network 
or (vehicle) traffic management system. For example, such a 
system could be deployed in a city to better schedule public 
transport and alleviate congestion (e.g., in downtown 
London).26 
As noted earlier, ideally, an appropriate management 
regime should admit all of these possible scenarios. 
However, that does not preclude creating different commons 
for different applications. For example, there are a number 
of compelling reasons why mobile operators or 
municipalities might prefer a closed commons that is 
restricted to a relatively small number of participants. These 
include the desire to enforce market power (a cartel is easier 
to sustain with a few members); technical efficiency (having 
a small number of well-known parties simplifies the design 
of the sharing protocol and enforcement); economic 
efficiency (having a small number of well-known parties 
simplifies long-term contracting which can reduce 
coordination costs in the face of uncertainty and sunk cost 
investments). In contrast, the viral adoption and mesh 
models may prefer a more open model to ensure that the 
costs for new nodes to join is minimized.  
2.2.3 Goals for successful management protocol 
To summarize, relative to the type of environment 
specified above, a successful Commons management 
protocol should strive to realize the following goals:  
2.2.3.1 Promote/facilitate innovation in wireless devices, 
services, and business models.  
This means minimizing barriers to entry/adoption of 
new technologies and switching costs. It also means 
avoiding lock-in that may block further deployments of new 
                                                          
25 See [LehSirGil04] for discussion of municipal 
wireless. 
26 These are real examples that are currently in 
operation. 
technology. In many cases, the success of a technology and 
the strategic interests of its sponsors promote lock-in. For 
example, consumers stay with Microsoft Windows because 
it satisfies many of their needs, offers them a huge selection 
of compatible software and hardware options (positive 
network effects), and changing to another operating system 
would incur switching costs. Microsoft benefits from its 
position and has no incentive to encourage switching. While 
it is not the responsibility of the management framework to 
dictate user tastes or business models that often are the 
cause for lock-in, the framework does need to strive to avoid 
regulatory impediments to deploying new technologies. For 
example, the growth of an installed base gives rise to vested 
interests that can be expected to appropriate the Commons 
for their own, seeking special protection against new 
technologies. We have already seen a hint of this in the 
efforts by WISPs and campus networks that have deployed 
infrastructure in unlicensed spectrum seeking to block or 
limit competing uses that may interfere with their use. Such 
efforts, while predictable need to be resisted. 
One benefit of adopting a minimalist regulatory 
framework may be to limit regulatory hooks that might 
otherwise be used to lock-in particular technologies. For 
example, identifying a specific technical protocol (e.g., 
CDMA or TDMA) may make it easier for incumbents 
whose choice was dictated by the specific technology to 
argue for protection.27 A minimalist regime helps 
precommit the regulator to letting the market dictate what 
technologies are successful. 
2.2.3.2 Minimize transaction costs for accessing 
spectrum.  
A principal benefit of unlicensed relative to licensed 
spectrum is that it minimizes the transaction costs associated 
with accessing spectrum. This chief virtue needs to be kept 
in mind when evaluating protocols for managing the 
Commons. Real-time usage fees (e.g., the per minute 
charges that characterize mobile telephony services) or the 
costs of accessing secondary markets to negotiate spectrum 
rights are obvious ways in which unlicensed usage may be 
deterred. However, transaction costs to accessing unlicensed 
may also arise in other ways. For example, an overly 
complex protocol for managing resource sharing will 
impose overhead costs on devices that can deter usage. 
Attempting to build in too strong interference avoidance 
protection into the Protocol may result in excessive 
requirements for device certification and enforcement that 
will further increase overhead costs associated with 
management of the Commons. Limiting devices 
expectations of protection may help control these overhead 
costs.  
                                                          
27 [David86] describes the dilemma for policy-makers 
who promote technologies that are subsequently abandoned 
and must then confront the "angry orphans." 
2.2.3.3 Provide mechanism for congestion management  
While we expect spectrum to be  less scarce in the 
future we are designing for, there still need to be robust 
mechanisms to address congestion when it occurs. As 
discussed earlier, however, we may be able to tolerate 
management mechanisms that are somewhat less 
allocatively efficient (i.e., emphasize coordination to allow 
all users to co-exist rather than seeking to selectively 
allocate better performance to higher value uses).  
2.2.3.4 Provide mechanism for modifying/establishing 
the etiquette 
An appropriate Commons management Protocol will 
need to include process for modifying and updating the 
Protocol. Such a mechanism is needed to allow the 
Commons protocol to evolve over time, and to facilitate the 
re-allocation of Commons spectrum as Licensed in the 
future should that be deemed desirable. A principal benefit 
of market-based spectrum reform is that it provides for a 
dynamic process for future adjustments. 
In Licensed spectrum, the Invisible Hand of the 
competitive market (acting via secondary markets) provides 
the mechanism for modifying the management regime. This 
is a chief benefit of the property rights regime because it can 
take advantage of the general legal and regulatory 
infrastructure used to enforce and manage property rights in 
the general economy.28  
In contrast, the Commons regime, of necessity, will 
require specialized (spectrum-specific) attention to its 
mechanism. Because rights in the Commons are shared 
among all qualified users, it will be challenging to upgrade 
the mechanism since it will require consensus.29 This 
suggests that reliance on industry standardization processes 
may offer the best option. These may be assisted by 
government action (e.g., by setting a time line for 
                                                          
28 As noted earlier, since Licensed will not realize a pure 
property regime (fee simple rights), there will continue to be 
regulation. For example, the existence of term limits or 
secondary use easements will provide a sufficient (although 
not necessary) basis for ensuring a need for on-going 
regulation in the Licensed regime. Furthermore, to the 
extent the adjudication of disputes over spectrum license 
rights requires specialized technical knowledge, there may 
be a requirement for specialized spectrum courts that would, 
by their nature, look more like regulatory agencies than 
traditional general purpose Courts. [Goodman04] discusses 
the likely problems inherent in relying on either trespass or 
nuisance law to protect spectrum property rights, while 
noting that the prospects for managing a Commons are 
equally troublesome. 
29 [Heller98] explains how an "anti-commons" arises 
when the right to exclude is distributed too widely making 
communally-managed property unusable. That is, when too 
many individuals possess decision rights, reconciling their 
collective interests can be difficult, resulting in paralysis.  
standardization), but the choice of the actual Protocol and its 
details may be best handled if delegated to an industry 
standards body. While de jure industry standardization 
processes are often cumbersome and vulnerable to many of 
the same capture risks as government regulatory bodies, 
they are the best that we have available.30 When the stakes 
are high and interests diverge, it is only natural that there are 
costs associated with adopting and transitioning to new 
technologies. The de facto standardization that would 
operate in the Licensed regime does not avoid these 
adjustment costs. The Darwinian market process that 
encourages survival of the fittest has significant costs for 
participants.  
Which standards organization might offer the best 
framework for managing the design of an appropriate 
Commons protocol requires further study. Whether it should 
be patterned on the IETF, NRIC, or the ITU is something 
that needs to be discussed, and will no doubt result in heated 
debate.  
Another obviously important issue to address is the 
question of how to transition from today's status quo to the 
future anticipated in this paper. This requires overcoming 
NIMBY and clearing spectrum of incumbents. This is a 
problem that is faced by both Licensed and Commons 
models, and may best be addressed if both are confronted at 
the same time. If, as is hoped, reform will significantly 
lower spectrum opportunity costs, than the ex post value 
(after the transition) of the spectrum will be much lower 
than historical experience with auctions suggests. If we 
really believe this is the case, then perhaps a Big Bang 
auction along the lines suggested by [KwerWm02] would 
offer a practical way to effect the transition. In the auction 
they propose, a large chunk of spectrum is transitioned to 
flexible Licensed use. At the same time, spectrum could be 
"purchased" for unlicensed use; however, if we really expect 
the auction proceeds to be low (reflecting the low expected 
future value of spectrum in a spectrum abundant world) then 
it may be reasonable to approximate this purchase price as 
zero. That is, simply designate as unlicensed a portion of the 
spectrum that will be made available and use some of the 
aggregate auction proceeds for clearing.31 
2.2.3.5 Promote fairness and non-discriminatory access 
The Commons Protocol ought to promote non-
discriminatory access. The Protocol should not attempt to 
sort uses of unlicensed spectrum into high and low value 
                                                          
30 See [Lehr92] or [DavGreen90] for discussion of 
economics of industry standardization processes.  
31 That is, do not require the government to purchase the 
unlicensed spectrum. Since everyone will be able to use the 
spectrum (including those that also or even preferentially 
may choose to operate in licensed spectrum) and since the 
unlicensed spectrum will lack strong interference protection 
that justifies paying more for licensed spectrum, such an 
approach seems reasonable.  
users, but should leave that as much as possible to the 
market. The Protocol should not offer differential quality of 
service. The notion of non-discriminatory access for all 
qualified (compliant) users of the Commons is fundamental 
to the notion of a Commons.  
2.2.3.6 Minimalist regulation 
To realize the benefits of market-based reform and to 
protect against the inefficiencies inherent in the traditional 
C&C approach to spectrum management, the Commons 
regime ought to aspire to minimalist regulation. Achieving 
this goal is difficult because it requires a delicate balance 
between simplicity and flexibility. Often the simplest rules 
are bright line rules, but these can lack flexibility. On the 
other hand, simple rules that are highly flexible may not 
adequately constrain behavior to accomplish the goal of the 
rules. Vague rules can lead to higher ex post enforcement 
costs and higher ex ante uncertainty if they fail to provide 
clear guidance as to what should be expected.  
3 TAXONOMY FOR EVALUATING SHARING 
PROTOCOLS FOR UNLICENSED SPECTRUM 
In this section we offer our preliminary thoughts on the 
sorts of rules that we think are likely to be needed to meet 
the requirements of an appropriate Commons management 
Protocol as described above. Before examining the range of 
rules that we think are likely to be needed to effectively 
manage a spectrum commons, it is worth considering why 
defining a suitable resource sharing protocol for a Commons 
is difficult. Some useful lessons may be gleaned from 
examining how resource sharing is managed in wired 
telephone networks and the Internet.  
3.1 Lessons from the past 
The traditional Public Switched Telephone Network 
(PSTN) supported one basic service, the voice call. Because 
the statistical properties of voice calls were well understood 
and quite regular,32 it was relatively easy to standardize on 
an appropriate unit of capacity (e.g., Erlangs) and to map 
voice calls into standardized 4 KHz voice channels which 
could be encoded with 64Kbps PCM.33 This regularity 
                                                          
32 That is the dynamic range of the human voice and ear 
for basic telephony calling is relatively narrow. Quality 
must be good enough (e.g., end-to-end delays should not 
exceed 250msec but there is a reasonably good tolerance to 
bit errors) and substantially better quality may not be very 
valuable. Of course, mobile telephony (which historically, 
has often been much lower quality) on the one hand and 
improved codecs (offering really high quality voice) on the 
other, we have learned that even voice calls can support a 
much wider range of quality of service than previously 
suspected. 
33 Of course, the monopoly/regulated industry structure 
helped solve the business problems that often plague 
standardization efforts in competitive markets. Note, that 
simplified the design of resource sharing mechanisms in the 
PSTN. 
In this environment, it was appropriate to use a 
centralized resource management policy that allocated units 
of capacity along each call route for the duration of the 
call.34 A separate signaling channel was used to manage 
resource allocations (capacity requests, allocation, and set-
up). When multiple carriers interconnected, this could be 
extended across carriers, with the allocation method offering 
strong isolation properties with hard guarantees of capacity 
and strict delay bounds (i.e., to limit interference between 
users and to ensure acceptable end-to-end quality). 
With the growth of data traffic, which is inherently 
more diverse (unlike voice calls, data traffic differs 
significantly in its bandwidth requirements and in its 
delay/error rate tolerance), the resource allocation problem 
became more complex. Although more diverse, relative to 
voice (which has inelastic QoS requirements35), data and 
data applications are typically more elastic (delay 
tolerant/flexible) and adaptive.36 The movement to packet-
based transport mechanisms offered a more flexible 
platform for dynamic resource allocation, but its 
implementation in the PSTN still heavily reflected the 
earlier "circuit-switched" mentality. For example, ATM 
allows variable bandwidth flows, but supports these in a 
hierarchical way that allows centralized resource allocation. 
Indeed, this has turned out to be a key virtue of ATM and 
explains why it is often used to support QoS-differentiated 
Internet services. A drawback to this approach, however, is 
that the capacity is still quantized based on the legacy 
                                                                                                  
this is obviously a obviously an over-simplification because 
modern voice networks encode voice in variety of ways that 
require much less than 64Kbps, although 64Kbps channels 
are often still allocated because of the need to accommodate 
legacy technology. 
34 As we explain further below, this centralized approach 
becomes much more problematic once the traffic 
environment becomes more heterogeneous and complex 
which is precisely what we expect in a wireless 
environment. 
35 As note 32 supra explains, even voice is much more 
"elastic" than many might have you believe. Users of VoIP 
and mobile phones have demonstrated a willingness to use 
even very poor quality voice in return for other features 
(mobility, lower price, etc.). 
36 Because "data" implies using computers, the ability to 
implement software processing is fundamental and makes 
the adaptivity of data applications something we take for 
granted. Contrast this to the traditional telephone which 
lacked flexibility by design. With the computerization of the 
telephone network, voice telephony becomes more like data 
and a similar level of adaptiveness (e.g., voice compression, 
protocol conversion, etc.) can take place to respond to 
capacity constraints.  
requirements of voice telephony (i.e., fixed cells instead of 
variable length datagrams) and the centralized management 
inherent in ATM imposes high overhead costs for short 
duration calls or data communications with relatively long 
datagrams.  
In contrast, the Internet emerged as a packet-based 
transport overlay on top of the PSTN. It offered a common 
grade of service ("best effort") that treated all packets the 
same, and did not constrain packets to a fixed length. The 
transport of packets is segmented into IP (hop-by-hop) and 
TCP (end-to-end) control, with BGP providing interdomain 
routing support. In the Internet, resource sharing is 
decentralized. There is no "common channel" signaling to 
allow applications or users to coordinate resource allocation. 
There is no strong protection in the basic Internet 
infrastructure to protect different users and applications 
from interfering with each other as in the PSTN. The 
applications themselves are expected to address the 
problems of congestion or noise along the end-to-end 
communication path through various mechanisms like error 
concealment or recovery protocols such as the reliability 
mechanisms in TCP or the FEC capabilities of some VOIP 
systems.  
Although lacking a centralized resource allocation 
mechanism,37 the Internet does have decentralized resource 
sharing mechanisms. Today, the dominant mechanism is 
based on the congestion control algorithms of TCP, and 
indeed other transport protocols (such as DCCP and XCP) 
are being designed to support the notion of TCP 
friendliness, even for relatively inelastic applications such 
as VOIP.38 In the Internet, end-nodes adjust their data rates 
to dynamically allocate bottleneck capacity according to the 
congestion avoidance algorithms in TCP or TCP-friendly 
protocols. These react to feedback from the network (in the 
form of packet loss, or in the form of Explicit Congestion 
Notification or ECN) and use the well known Additive 
Increase/Multiplicative Decrease control law.39 
Of course, as is increasingly apparent even in the 
wireline Internet, these decentralized sharing algorithms do 
a poor job when one seeks to integrate inelastic applications 
with the diverse elastic data applications that have 
                                                          
37 Resources in the Internet are managed by network 
operators who can redirect traffic by manipulating BGP to 
implement policy-based routing and by dynamically altering 
the physical capacity available for Internet traffic (e.g., use 
ATM to support dynamic bandwidth allocation to virtual IP 
circuits). 
38 Many of these ideas are described at: 
http://www.icir.org/floyd/tcp_friendly.html 
39 This leads to a share for each source of the bottleneck 
capacity that is inversely proportional to the round trip time 
seen by each source to its respective destination, and 
otherwise proportional to the capacity at a shared 
bottleneck, amongst the n flows that co-exist there. 
historically dominated Internet traffic (e.g., asynchronous 
file transfers). The need to accommodate such things as 
VoIP and streaming media have driven even wire-based 
Internet providers to seek improved mechanisms to 
dynamically allocate resources such as MPLS, DiffServ, or 
IntServ. However, to date, these have been implemented in 
a centralized way (i.e., within a single carrier domain) to 
support QoS differentiated services for enterprise VPNs. 
Industry is only now developing the frameworks to 
implement this across interprovider domains.40 
More typically, ISPs have found it easier to simply 
over-provision to address capacity constraints.41 This is due, 
in part, to the fact that the sort of contention-based 
mechanisms that are used in TCP and the Internet tend to 
work best in lightly-loaded networks. VoIP coexists fine 
with FTP, email, and other data traffic as long as the 
network is not congested. While centralized resource 
allocation mechanisms (e.g., ATM or token ring) might 
provide more assurance of bounded access delays, 
distributed protocols (e.g., TCP or Ethernet) provide similar 
delays when the networks are lightly loaded. However, the 
centralized approaches which may work well for relatively 
slow changing source and traffic matrices, are often less 
robust in very dynamic situations (as in Ad Hoc networks). 
In these latter situations, that may more reasonably 
characterize future wireless environments, a more 
decentralized/distributed approach may be the only feasible 
way to manage resources.42  
3.2 Rules for managing a Spectrum Commons 
Now, let us consider what this suggests about the 
design of sharing protocols in wireless networks. First, note 
that much of the licensed spectrum is managed in a 
centralized way that is analogous to the traditional PSTN 
(since much of it is allocated to cellular telephone use or 
else to TV broadcast).43 On the other hand, much of the 
unlicensed spectrum (e.g. in the ISM band for WiFi and 
other Wireless LAN and Bluetooth use) is managed in a 
decentralized way that is analogous to (or indeed is the same 
thing as) the Internet. In  unlicensed, the applications are 
adaptive, and resource isolation can be less strict. 
With respect to licensed spectrum, the rationale for 
managing resources in a way that is analogous to the PSTN 
centralized approach is obvious in the case of mobile 
                                                          
40 For example, see [Briscoe05] or http://cfp.mit.edu/qos 
for current work on mechanisms to support interprovider 
QoS. 
41 [Odlyzko98] has argued that it is easier and less 
expensive to simply over-provision than to try and 
implement complex mechanisms to support differentiated 
QoS in the wired Internet. 
42 See [Kelly00] and [Reed05] for further discussion. 
43 We focus here on commercial spectrum, since the 
government spectrum is mostly C&C. 
telephony (i.e., similar services, similar ancestry, and need 
to interconnect seamlessly44). In the case of broadcast 
television spectrum, the centralized approach is an artifact 
of legacy regulation. With respect to mobile telephony, the 
acute scarcity of spectrum, which itself is largely an 
artificial artifact of legacy regulation, provides powerful 
economic incentives to use spectrum efficiently.45 Hence, 
mobile carriers deploy sophisticated centralized resource 
management techniques to achieve high spectrum reuse 
(dynamic power management, directional antennas, etc.). In 
contrast, the current regulatory regime provides little 
economic incentive for broadcasters to use spectrum 
efficiently.46 Current regulations provide strong interference 
protection to broadcasters to protect the ability of the worst-
case "dumb" receivers to receive the broadcast signal, while 
constraining the broadcast licensees ability to benefit from 
using the spectrum more efficiently.47 Consequently, the 
typical broadcaster uses a minimal set of transmitters to 
cover their licensed footprint. This architecture uses too 
much power for receivers that are close, and is vulnerable to 
even low levels of interference for receivers that are near the 
edge of the serving area. With smarter receivers, spectral 
efficiency could be enhanced significantly. Thus, broadcast 
networks, in contrast to communication networks, might 
benefit significantly if resource management responsibility 
were decentralized.48 
                                                          
44 That is, a key feature of mobile telephony service is 
the ability to make calls between mobile and fixed-line 
telephones. 
45 With a fixed amount of licensed spectrum, a carrier's 
only way to expand service is to use its spectrum more 
intensively. Indeed, the artificial constraints may even 
induce excessive investment in spectrum reuse. 
46 The opportunity to cram additional digital television 
channels into their licensed spectrum provides some 
incentive to increase spectrum use.  
47 The classic television (or radio) broadcaster is 
advertising supported and so its business model rewards it 
for reaching as many receivers as possible. Since the 
broadcaster does not control the choice of receivers (it is an 
open system in the sense that receivers and transmitters are 
designed independently), the broadcaster has an incentive to 
maximize the reach to the lowest quality receiver. 
48 That is, since interference occurs at the receiver and 
the receiver is in the best position to assess its local RF 
environment, the receiver is in the best position to adapt if it 
possesses the requisite intelligence. In an environment like 
the current TV environment in which the receivers do not 
have a transmitter capability, the current model of granting 
them interference protection is especially inefficient since it 
deters incentives for upgrading the receivers. Of course, to 
the extent that modern media broadcasters become more 
interactive (pay-per-view, interactive gaming), the receivers 
will need to become transmitters and the logic for 
decentralizing resource management are attenuated. 
In contrast, resource sharing in unlicensed spectrum 
has been decentralized and more closely follows the model 
of the Internet. However, the communication environment 
that prevails in wireless Internet is substantially more 
complex than in the wired Internet. There are a number of 
reasons for this. First, the propagation characteristics of 
wireless signals in real-world environments (with buildings, 
rain, and lots of  unintentional sources of interference) are 
much more complex than in the typical wired environment 
where the regularity of the transmission medium may be 
significantly controlled (both by nature and by design).49  
Second, wired communications constrain interference 
to the path followed by the wire,50 whereas wireless signals 
propagate in all directions (in the absence of directional 
antennas).51 Thus, in wireless you not only have to deal with 
the interference to communications that intentionally share 
the communication path, but also communications that 
unintentionally share the communication path. That is, 
wireless devices cause "spectral pollution" that additively 
increases the noise floor for all users of the spectrum. In the 
context of wireless, the need to address such unintentional 
interference, poses an additional challenge that seldom 
arises in the context of wired communications. For example, 
wireless operators need regulatory mechanisms to 
adjudicate interference disputes, whereas wired operators do 
not.  
Third, in part due to the nature of wireless 
communications and in part due to the more competitive 
industry structure, there is much more heterogeneity in how 
radio systems are designed compared to the wired 
communication systems in the traditional PSTN or 
Internet.52 Current wireless systems -- even for such well-
defined services as 2G mobile telephony -- are quite diverse, 
                                                          
49 That is, wired media is a controlled environment by its 
nature, and such media is purposefully designed to minimize 
many of the problems that arise in wireless (multipath, 
attenuation effects, etcera). For example, the refractive 
index of optical fiber and cable shielding are used to 
manage the propagation environment. 
50 Cross-talk problems aside. Moreover, electronic wired 
transmissions can result in additional wireless noise when 
the cables act as giant antennas. 
51 Employing directional antennas is expensive and 
keeping them aimed appropriately entails additional cost, 
especially if mobility needs to be supported. 
52 Although as noted, in the last decade, as a 
consequence of the growth of the IP traffic and telecom 
liberalization which has lead to increased wireline facilities-
based competition, there has been a proliferation of next 
generation telecoms that are competing to offer QoS 
differentiated services. Thus, even wired infrastructure has 
become more heterogeneous than in the past (e.g., contrast 
Level 3 to Verizon network architectures today versus 
Verizon and SBC a decade ago).  
embodying a number of modulation schemes (TDMA, 
CDMA), antenna designs (omni-directional and directional), 
and power modulation schemes. Each of these systems 
impose different constraints and demands on resource 
sharing. Additionally, the need to support mobility – which 
is often a key value-added feature of wireless services – 
adds further complexity (i.e., dynamic routing is hard, and 
especially so in ad hoc networks).53  
Fourth, the fact that wireless communications media 
are inherently lossy poses a special problem for the 
congestion algorithm used in TCP and the wired Internet. 
Without appropriate modifications, TCP too often interprets 
dropped packets to congestion when in fact it is due to poor 
link quality. Better protocols take advantage of good links 
when they can (high data rates) and don't try to send when 
the links are poor (regardless of the congestion condition, no 
point trying to send when you cannot establish link-level 
connectivity with the receiver node). Unlike in the wired 
world, the appropriate sharing protocol needs to be multi-
layered in a way that may be avoided in the wired world 
(where link layer reliability is better assured).54 
Addressing this complexity in a decentralized, open 
access environment while allowing flexibility in the choice 
of technology poses a daunting problem. In the following 
subsections, we discuss the need/challenges associated with 
various types of regulatory constraints that we expect to be 
necessary. As we will discuss, these have both technical and 
institutional implications. Some may be more appropriately 
thought of as technical constraints (e.g., power limits) while 
others may more naturally be thought of as institutional 
constraints (e.g., enforcement mechanisms). The types of 
constraints we consider include:  
• (1) Requirement that all transmitters also have 
receiver capability (to enable adaptation) 
• (2) Power restrictions (to limit interference) 
• (3) Signaling capability (to enable unlicensed 
devices to communicate resource needs) 
• (4) Contention/allocation mechanism (allocate 
resources in congestion) 
• (5) Enforcement mechanisms (to enforce 
compliance with other rules) 
• (6) Reversibility (to allow resources to be de-
allocated and deployed for other uses) 
• (7) Security and Privacy protection (to ensure 
mechanism respects these needs) 
                                                          
53 Supporting mobility in the wired Internet is also 
challenging. 
54 On the need for multi-layered protocols for ad hoc 
wireless networks, see [Kawad04]. 
3.2.1 No Transmit only devices, receive-only devices 
have no interference protection rights55 
Requiring every potential transmitter also to have a 
receiver capability56 creates the potential for a feedback 
control loop that would allow the transmitter's behavior to 
be modified. Since the transmitters are the source of the 
signal that creates the possibility for interference, regulating 
their operation is an essential element in effective 
interference management.  
Additionally, a key motivation for this rule is to allow 
the transmitters to be preemptible which would be a 
requirement for operating as an overlay (i.e., the primary 
licensed user gets to pre-empt unlicensed use).57 Strong 
assurance of a reliable preemption capability would likely 
be a pre-requisite for sharing most government spectrum, 
especially, the spectrum allocated for primary use by public 
safety and emergency systems. Furthermore, the ability to 
be preempted would prove useful in dynamic reallocation of 
the spectrum (e.g., shutting off all the unlicensed 
transmitters if the Commons Protocol was to be changed, or 
if the spectrum was to be reallocated to another use). 
Building the capability for real-time adaptability is 
essential in the context of a decentralized management 
framework. Lacking a centralized controller, devices will 
need to be able to sense their environment or communicate 
with each other to implement an optimal sharing 
mechanism. Otherwise, how would a transmitter learn that it 
was interfering with another receiver?  
Building in a receiver capability is also essential to 
implement an ad hoc mesh. For nodes to act as repeaters or 
routers, they need to be able to both receive and transmit. 
Although acting in this way should not be a requirement of 
every node that wishes to operate in unlicensed spectrum,58 
the requirement that every transmitter have a receiver 
capability is consistent with system designs that encourage 
such cooperation. This is an added benefit, but not the basis 
for requiring the rule. 
Complementing the above requirement, and 
recognizing that not every receiver will need to transmit, 
there should be no interference protection for receivers that 
do not have the ability to transmit. For example, there may 
                                                          
55 We would like to credit David Reed and Andy 
Lippman of the MIT Media Lab for first suggesting the need 
for a rule like this. Actually, they argue that there should be 
no "receive only devices."  
56 The receive capability does not have to be 
implemented wirelessly. The upstream link could be 
provided via a wired network. 
57 Note, "listen-before-talking" offers one protocol 
strategy for pre-emption. However, this may not ensure a 
strong preemption capability (e.g, as might be enabled with 
a "kill code").  
58 That is, as we explain further below, the regulatory 
framework should not require that nodes cooperate. 
be sensors that cannot transmit. Receivers that have no 
ability to transmit cannot let anyone know if they are being 
interfered with and so eliminate the possibility of dynamic 
adjustment. As long as they are willing to live with 
whatever interference they encounter, such devices may be 
allowed since they do not add to the interference 
experienced by others. Conversely, were such "receive-
only" devices granted an entitlement to interference 
protection, this could not be readily implemented in a 
decentralized fashion. Potential transmitters would not know 
that the receive-only devices were there to be interfered 
with.59 
3.2.2 Power restrictions  
In a wireless system, transmission power is probably 
the single most important design variable. The power of a 
wireless device determines the range of communication that 
can be achieved, and the geographic scope of any 
interference that transmissions may cause. Power 
management is also critical factor for mobile devices to 
maximize battery life. Power management also impacts 
other design characteristics of the radio system. For 
example, in a given part of the spectrum, different nodes can 
use some Media Access Protocol once they have agreed 
upon a common coding and multiplexing technique. 
However, the choice of coding and multiplexing itself (and 
the available antennae) are constrained by the available 
power budget. For example, Code Division Multiple Access 
(CDMA) requires much more constrained power to avoid 
distance effects with interference, whereas Time Division 
Multiple Access (TDMA) protocols can be sloppier about 
power allocation (unless a cell or region is adjacent to one 
that is using the same part of the spectrum for CDMA). 
Moreover, we should not expect to be able to limit 
unlicensed devices to just one of these choices. In the 
Software defined Radio Forum, even the lowest tier (tier 1) 
of radios (including some existing available cellular phones, 
e.g. quad band) can choose between CDMA and TDMA so 
the problem is endemic. Furthermore, if the radio is 
frequency agile, there is the relationship between antennae, 
frequency and power which must be addressed.60 
Consequently, it is hardly surprising that much of the 
research on models for managing shared access to 
unlicensed has focused on protocols for power 
management.61 
                                                          
59 An exception that might be acceptable would be some 
spectrum cut-outs to address legacy users who may not be 
able to be efficiently relocated in spectrum that may be 
newly allocated for unlicensed use (e.g., satellite 
downlinks). 
60 That is, the higher the frequency, the more power that 
is required to cover an area with omni-directional antennae, 
but the less with dish/directional antennae (see, for example, 
[VanMatHaak98]). 
61 See, for example, [SataPeha00], [Peha97], or 
[Kawad04]. 
The aggregate power from all the transmitters in a 
particular portion of the spectrum determine the level of 
interference (noise) realized at different points in space. In 
the worst case scenario of an ad hoc network, wherein we 
assume that nodes do not know a priori where other nodes 
are, the transmissions from all other nodes except the one 
that a receiving node is communicating with will be seen as 
noise. To maximize the capacity of such a system, it will 
generally be advisable to limit power and rely on multi-hop 
transmissions to communicate.62 Contrast this to the case for 
a closed system where devices may use knowledge of the 
spatial, temporal, and frequency distribution of signals to 
separate signals (e.g., using MIMO and MUD techniques), 
thereby rendering what might otherwise be considered as 
"noise," additional information. With suitable incentives for 
such "strong" cooperation, the devices may realize 
significant cooperation gain ([Reed02]), however, this 
assumes a level of cooperation that may be difficult to 
achieve and inappropriate to enforce in the context of the 
regulatory mechanism.63 
However, the optimal power limit for an individual 
device even in a mesh network depends on the node density. 
If nodes are sparse, you need higher power even to reach 
your nearest neighbor. Thus, extremely tight (per device) 
power limits may limit communications in unlicensed. As 
we argued earlier, since we expect unlicensed to be more 
likely to be favored (relative to licensed) in situations where 
congestion is less of a problem, restricting device power 
overly to maximize capacity and to limit interference seems 
inappropriate. This, however, is the approach that has been 
adopted for underlays (to protect interference to the primary 
users). 
Rather than limiting the power of individual devices, it 
would be better to limit the aggregate power of all the 
transmitters together. That is, one use may be two devices 
that want to communicate over a relatively large area and 
need higher power to communicate; whereas a group of 
other devices may be organized into a mesh that uses 
multihops to provide connectivity. Each of these will appear 
as noise to the other, so a limit on the aggregate system 
power would be more appropriate. This, in effect, is the idea 
behind defining an interference temperature. In this 
approach, the interference temperature is measured as the 
                                                          
62 [XieKumar04] use information theoretic analysis to 
show that "decode and forward" is order optimal for 
network capacity.  
63 That is, any closed system in the unlicensed network 
may choose to adopt a cooperative approach. However the 
regulatory framework should eschew mandating that 
devices cooperate except in some minimalist fashion. For 
example, it seems likely that any rules that specified that 
devices implement MIMO or MUD would need to enforce a 
level of cooperation that might make it more difficult 
(costly) to introduce new technologies or may conflict with 
promoting competition. 
local noise level arising from all of the transmissions that 
are received at that locale.  
Interference temperature was proposed as an approach 
for measuring the local noise floor, and hence, as a better 
way to regulate signal power over a transmitter's footprint.64 
The interference temperature could be used to set limits on 
the maximum level of interference a receiver could expect 
to tolerate. With limits on the interference temperature 
allowed in a region, a transmitter could determine whether it 
could transmit or not based on how its transmissions would 
incrementally change this temperature if  it could observe 
the interference temperature dynamically and has a good 
model of the interference implications of its transmissions. 
Simply observing the local interference conditions at the 
transmitter would likely not be sufficient.65 While there are 
obviously numerous problems associated with 
implementing an interference temperature approach, the 
opposition to this proposal was also motivated by the 
recognition that such an approach, if adopted successfully, 
would permit further constraints on the use of exclusive use 
licensed spectrum (e.g., by facilitating the implementation 
of secondary use underlay easements).  
Another problem arises in the context of mixed power 
uses of unlicensed spectrum. As suggested above, there may 
be multiple, incompatible systems seeking to share the 
unlicensed spectrum. Indeed, enabling such a scenario is 
precisely the intent of promoting the unlicensed model (as 
discussed earlier). When devices with mixed power share 
spectrum, the hidden node problem arises (i.e., high power 
devices interfere with low power devices that the high 
power devices fail to see). In the absence of a mechanism to 
address this problem (e.g., a signaling mechanism), it may 
be preferable to limit the interference rights of low power 
devices. That is, if they cannot operate because admissible 
higher power devices do not see them, that is their problem.  
Finally, in part due to NIMBY concerns, the 
opposition to UWB and attempts to develop an interference 
temperature approach to enable underlays has merit. 
Primary uses, especially those that are willing to pay for an 
exclusive license and the added interference protection it 
implies, have a valid fear that spectral pollution will raise 
the noise floor. Moreover, the current use of primary 
licensed spectrum may not provide an accurate measure of 
where the floor should be since primary uses may extend 
their ability to operate in the noise floor (introduce more 
sensitive receivers) and may themselves raise system noise 
as a consequence of their own usage growth. On the other 
hand, if the power limits are too strict, that will severely 
                                                          
64 See [FCC03a]. 
65 This may not be true. Rapid estimates of the number 
of other nodes or the  level of interference might be possible 
using techniques from large deviation theory as were used to 
address the problem of measurement based admission 
control for Internet traffic which is self similar or otherwise 
heavy-tailed. See, for example,  
limit the flexibility of how the unlicensed spectrum is used 
(range of devices, applications that can be supported). While 
unlicensed devices are likely to be power limited even in 
dedicated spectrum, the per device limits that could be used 
and the aggregate flux limits could be higher than is likely 
to be practical in an underlay context. This suggests that the 
unlicensed Commons may operate best if implemented in 
dedicated unlicensed spectrum. 
3.2.3 Signaling capability  
A key attribute of ad hoc networks is that they will be 
decentralized and devices will have access to only local 
information. A signaling capability would enable devices to 
acquire and share information on wider-area concerns. 
Devices would signal their intent and aspects of their mode 
of operation in a particular region, thereby letting other 
devices know their whereabouts and operating parameters.66  
This could play an important role in a number of 
contexts. First, it could help address the mixed power 
problem. Second, a signaling capability also may help 
address the mixed power problem (see above). Third, it 
could be  used to simplify coordination and to share global 
information that could prove useful in interference 
management (e.g., regarding the interference temperature at 
different points in space). Fourth, it could be useful in 
supporting enforcement of the management Protocol, 
including implementing a payment mechanism. For 
example, if could be useful in determining the identity of 
devices. Fifth, it could be used to provide location-based 
services and context-dependent resource allocation 
adjustments.  
It may be best to implement the signaling capability in 
an out-of-band common signaling channel.67 This might 
simplify coordination. Additionally, it would allow faster 
responses and adjustments (e.g., a control channel to induce 
collective responses such as preemption). Moreover, since 
wireless is inherently a broadcast medium (in contrast to 
wired communications), multi-destination protocols are 
inherently very efficient. Informing other users of ones' 
intent and even getting consensus, while difficult to achieve 
atomically, is far more efficient than in a multi-party 
wireline collaboration. 
Mandating a signaling capability is problematic, 
however, since it poses a threat to privacy. Although we 
might presume intra-group trust might exist among a mesh 
of users, it seems ill-advised to presume that inter-group 
trust will exist among all devices sharing the unlicensed 
                                                          
66 Of course, the low power devices would have to be 
sufficiently high power to use the signaling channel 
protocol, and receivers would have to be sufficiently  
67 That is, "out-of-band" in the sense that the signaling 
takes place in a way that is reserved for signaling and is 
common to all devices sharing the spectrum. It could be "in-
band" in the sense that it shares the spectrum used by the 
unlicensed devices. 
spectrum. The privacy issues raised will depend critically on 
what is "signaled." If devices signal their identity, then the 
privacy concerns are likely to be great. If the devices only 
signal their power, then privacy might be protected and 
there may still be sufficient global information available to 
manage interference. Lack of an ability to identify devices, 
however, may limit opportunities for enforcement.68 
Because of the privacy concerns, it seems desirable to 
limit any regulatory requirement for signaling to power.69 
Precisely what about power needs to be signaled still needs 
to be determined. 
3.2.4 Contention/allocation mechanism  
When congestion occurs, there will need to be rules to 
address how resources should be allocated. To allow 
maximum technical flexibility, it seems desirable that the 
regulations be cautious in specifying any particular 
mechanism. For example, it would clearly be wrong to 
mandate use of the TCP congestion management approach 
for the reasons cited above, however, it may be desirable to 
mandate that a "TCP-like" or "TCP-friendly" protocol be 
implemented to enable contention management. (This has 
the added advantage of providing easier integration with the 
wired Internet.) 
[Friedman05] suggests that an appropriate approach 
may be to specify "manners" instead of a specific protocol, 
wherein the appropriate rule would allocate power using a 
Wireless Fair Share (WFS) rule that is analogous to the fair-
share algorithm used in TCP in the Internet. This appears 
consistent with fair queuing and the ECN-based feedback 
mechanism proposed by [Briscoe05]. The "manners"-
approach offers a way to generalize the rule (allowing 
flexibility), while still capturing the benefits of structure and 
the efficiency from fair queuing. This contrasts with a rule 
that specified a particular sharing algorithm.  
Furthermore, for many applications that have elastic 
requirements (are delay tolerant), the slow adaptation 
process of in-band management mechanisms is likely to be 
fine. However, if the spectrum is also to be shared with 
delay-intolerant (non-rate-adaptive) applications, then there 
will also be a need for an out-of-band control mechanism. 
The out-of-band signaling channel would help in 
implementing this. 
3.2.5 Enforcement mechanisms  
A critical component of an appropriate Protocol for a 
Commons is the enforcement mechanism. There are two 
levels at which these need to operate. First, the absence of 
                                                          
68 Enforcement mechanisms that are embedded in the 
protocol (e.g., non-complying devices are collectively 
spammed by the other devices) may still be used. But, 
enforcement based on reputation effects may not be 
applicable. 
69 Note this does not limit the amount of information that 
devices may voluntarily share in the interests of supporting 
enhanced services. 
strong interference protection in the Commons signals to 
devices that it is a "Jungle environment" and that the best 
way to survive in such an environment is for devices to be 
robust (adaptive) to congestion in their local environment. 
To the extent unlicensed devices are encouraged to become 
more robust (i.e., not rely on the strong interference 
protection offered to licensed users), the need for 
enforcement is reduced. Thus, self-reliance is a substitute 
for external enforcement.  
Second, the technical protocol should implement 
decentralized enforcement mechanisms. That is, the 
protocol should incorporate mechanisms to make 
appropriate behavior (spectrum efficient, cooperative 
behavior) incentive compatible and self-enforcing.  
Third, in the event that users deviate from the protocol 
(e.g., by using non-complying devices or by altering the 
code for their software radios), there needs to be an 
appropriate legal/regulatory institutional framework to 
resolve conflicts and discourage such "illegal" behavior. 
The existence of both such mechanisms reduces the burden 
on either.  
Thus, for example, the protocol can specify a game 
(i.e., consisting of a well-defined set of admissible 
strategies, sequence of moves, and payoffs for different 
strategies) that has many desirable equilibria (so it is not 
constraining) but is so structured as to preclude undesirable 
equilibria.70 There is already a large literature of protocol 
games that induce cooperative equilibria.71 Earlier, we 
discussed the desirability of requiring any admissible 
protocol to demonstrate that it is "TCP-friendly," while 
eschewing specifying that the protocol be required to 
implement any specific game.  
Of course, even if you have restricted the class of 
games to those which enforce desirable cooperative 
behavior, you have to make sure that devices play the 
designated game. If devices are free to choose which game 
they play, they may be tempted and able to exploit the 
expectation of cooperation opportunistically. While this is 
true, it is not up to the protocol to ensure that everyone 
complies. Extra-regulatory mechanisms can help resolve 
that issue. For example, Part 15 behavior is enforced via a 
mandatory certification process. While it is possible for end-
users to modify equipment after the fact, the threat of legal 
sanctions (fines, prison) is sufficient to induce general 
compliance. Nevertheless, the decentralized commons does 
raise important enforcement issues that need to be discussed 
                                                          
70 For example, [Neel05] recommend using the theory of 
supermodular games to constrain admissible sharing 
protocols for distributed management of wireless networks. 
These are attractive because they have a number of desirable 
properties, including a stable steady-state equilibrium which 
allows one to ensure convergence.  
71 See, for example, [Friedman05], [JohTs03], 
[SataPeha00]. 
further. These are addressed in the following two sub-
sections. 
3.2.5.1 Technical protocol enforcement mechanisms 
One of the challenges posed for management of the 
Commons is that enforcement is a public good like national 
defense. If it is costly to detect and punish deviant behavior, 
then nodes have an incentive to free-ride on the enforcement 
efforts of others. Therefore, protocols that minimize the 
individual costs of enforcement can make it more likely that 
nodes will comply. One way to do this might be to extend 
the idea of notional pricing protocols to compensate nodes 
for enforcement (e.g., by granting "enforcing" nodes 
preferential forwarding treatment).72 Additionally, if 
spectrum is relatively abundant so that cooperation may not 
be a zero or negative sum game, relatively light-weight 
mechanisms may be sufficient to enforce cooperation (e.g., 
akin to what is used in BitTorrent and other "incentive-
compatible" peer-to-peer systems). This is a rich area for 
further exploration.  
3.2.5.2 Institutional enforcement mechanisms 
In addition to the intrinsic enforcement 
mechanisms, there will need to be external, institutional 
enforcement mechanisms. The most obvious approach here 
is to rely on a "Part 15"-like certification process. To 
minimize the regulatory intrusion, the certification authority 
ought to be delegated to an industry association or some 
other quasi-private entity, rather than a government agency 
like the FCC.  
The likelihood that software radios will play an 
important role in future unlicensed systems raises additional 
problems for how to enforce the certification rules. 
Hardware certification works relatively well because it is 
relatively difficult for the typical user to modify hardware 
and because there are a relatively few number of hardware 
manufacturers (so that government oversight of their actions 
and the assignment of liability is relatively easy). In 
contrast, certifying software is much more difficult because 
there are likely to be many more versions of software to 
certify and because it can be changed much more easily 
after the fact.73  
In the noisy, stochastic wireless environment, it 
will be hard to detect and enforce violations 
([Goodman04]). While true, this problem is unavoidable if 
we wish to promote environments that support ad hoc 
wireless operation (i.e., anonymous, random entry/exit of 
nodes, and hence, mirror the ideal of competitive markets). 
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73 These features lead [Faulhab05] to be skeptical as to 
the viability of cognitive radios in practical consequences. 
Indeed, at a conference in May 2005, Professor Faulhaber 
referred to cognitive radios as the "Kalashnikov rifle" of the 
wireless future because of the threat they pose for "hit-and-
run" violations. 
Furthermore, although determined criminals may not be 
deterred by legal sanctions that are hard to enforce, the 
average user, device or application designer/manufacturer is 
likely to be deterred and hence legal sanctions (fines for 
deviations) are likely to be broadly effective. This is 
analogous to the issue of compliance with pollution control 
in automobiles: although it is relatively easy to modify a 
car's catalytic converter to enhance mileage performance, 
most car drivers comply with the pollution abatement 
standards. Similarly, while it is possible to modify 
implementations of TCP to behave "greedily" and so 
enhance individual node performance in the wireline 
Internet, most users do not do this. 
Several strategies may prove useful for supporting 
the certification of software radios. First, bright-line rules to 
define that which must be certified and that which is open to 
user modification will be useful. Thus, the operating system 
for the software radio may be certified, but the applications 
that are enabled by that operating system may not need to 
be. Limiting the functionality of the operating system  
would offer a mechanism for controlling system behavior. 
For example, the operating system may be allowed to 
support modulation selection and dynamic power 
adjustment, but not frequency agility, which may still 
require hardware certification.74 
Second, the protocols that implement the 
Commons ought to be designed to support compliance 
testing. For example, self-certifying code75 or restrictions on 
the structure of any games implemented by the protocol (as 
suggested by [Neel05]) can help make it easier to certify 
whether a device or implementation of the Protocol is 
compliant.  
Third, alternatively, it may be possible to have a 
registry of pre-defined and tested behaviors and have 
software selection (rather than definition) of the appropriate 
algorithms. Such an approach would shift conformance tests 
off-line and is similar to the use of signed code. A more 
sophisticated intermediate approach might be to employ 
proof-carrying behavioral codes. 
Fourth, to ease detection, the enforcement mechanism 
may benefit form employing witnesses. In wireless, 
triangulation can be used to locate misbehaving devices and 
kick them off the network or shut them down (e.g., by 
invoking the capability that makes the Protocol 
interruptible). Access to a signaling capability can facilitate 
enforcement by providing a mechanism for distributed 
reporting.  
To be consistent with enforcement while respecting 
privacy needs, there must be secure identity mechanisms, 
                                                          
74 We are not recommending such a limitation but rather 
suggesting the type of things that might be done. Indeed, 
this is close to the approach that the FCC has adopted.  
75 [Greaves03] suggests how application interfaces may 
be designed using "pebbles" to make them self-certifying.  
and a variety of algorithms to assess, distribute and combine 
reports on node trust and reputation. This is essential for 
decentralized enforcement. The alternative is a centralized 
approach. The centralized approach will work for 
centralized services, but many of the unlicensed spectrum 
uses will have inherently decentralized applications, and 
users may not wish to submit to centralized enforcement. 
There are a number of unsolved problems in decentralized 
enforcement. At the very least, fully decentralized currency 
(or tokens of trust) and identity mechanisms are not solved 
problems, nor are all of the actual incentive alignment 
problems ([FeigShen02]).  
An important aspect of mechanism design is the 
ability to be able to negotiate between agents (in our case 
cognitive radios, or their agent, the provider) without 
revealing unnecessary information. Luckily, progress has 
been made on how this might be accomplished (which also 
has promise for resolving some of the negotiation issues 
arising around settlements and QoS for wired ISPs and 
telecoms). For example, this includes solutions to the so-
called Millionaires’ paradox (two agents find out which is 
richer without finding out actually how much either of them 
have). In general, then, a set of nodes could negotiate a 
spectrum share at a given power level, with another set of 
nodes, without necessarily revealing their location or 
identity. Although designing the actual protocols to do this 
would be non-trivial, the progress in work on zero-
knowledge protocols suggests this should be doable 
([CanGold96]).  
Finally, it is worth spending a little time thinking 
about the legal/regulatory enforcement apparatus that might 
be employed. A number of legal scholars have addressed 
this question, focusing on the types of property rights that 
might be assigned to unlicensed devices and the 
implications of this for enforcement costs.76 Since 
incentives to enforce compliance are generally weaker in a 
Commons (i.e., because there is no licensee who internalizes 
both the costs and benefits of enforcement), it is better if the 
need to enforce is less. Fortunately, as we have discussed, 
this is likely to be the case and techniques exist to reduce 
the costs of enforcement in distributed environments. 
However, when external enforcement is required, it does not 
seem advisable to expect individual users to seek Court or 
even regulatory-agency remedies. Rather, this is likely to be 
the role for either the central regulatory agency, or its 
delegated authority which may be able to seek liability 
damages from manufacturers of infringing equipment. For 
this reason, the liability rules used to assign responsibility 
for controlling deviations will be critical.  
In most cases, it may be unreasonable to believe 
that the node operators or infrastructure owners will be able 
to adequately control compliance and so assigning liability 
to the users of unlicensed devices may be inappropriate in 
                                                          
76  For example, see [Goodman04], [Benjam03], 
[Werbach02]. 
many contexts.77 Indeed, the current certification approach 
assigns principal liability to device manufacturers. Of 
course this might differ depending on the context (e.g., 
consider the case of a municipal wireless network as 
opposed to an anonymous ad hoc network).  
3.2.6 Reversibility  
A critical aspect of any mechanism used to manage 
spectrum is that it must be possible to reclaim the spectrum 
is it would be better used for another purpose. This has both 
a short-term and long-term aspect. In the short-term it must 
be possible to both allocate and de-allocate resources. In the 
longer-term, we need to be able to modify the protocol used 
to manage the Commons or potentially reallocate the 
spectrum as Licensed if that is desired. We need to build 
into the Protocol lease mechanisms to allow devices to be 
de-allocated spectrum (turned off).  
In the short-term, there are already mechanisms for 
managing such access at a higher level. For example, WiFi 
operators already do this by DHCP address lease expiry, as 
do many (e.g. pay-as-you-go) cellular telephone operators. 
The same mechanisms that allow the spectrum to be 
preemptible may also be used to de-allocate spectrum. For 
rapid dynamic reallocation, a key challenge for unlicensed 
arises because many of the decentralized protocols adapt 
rather slowly. Thus it will be important to provide for a 
control plane for such allocation/re-allocation mechanisms. 
With licensed spectrum, active secondary markets 
provide a valid mechanism to recycle spectrum when its 
value in its current use is less than the opportunity cost of 
the spectrum. In principle, these secondary markets for 
licensed spectrum could operate both in the short (real-time 
markets) and long term, although today only the latter exist 
for wholesale trade.78 In contrast, unlicensed spectrum lacks 
such an obvious mechanism. In the longer term, we need a 
way to ensure that unlicensed spectrum could be cleared. 
Such a mechanism is necessary in case the spectrum is 
polluted by too many garbage applications. Although a key 
point of unlicensed spectrum is to permit experimentation, 
there needs to be a way to clear out bad experiments and 
low value uses if it turns out that spectrum is, in fact, 
relatively scarce. Applications that produce less surplus than 
the opportunity cost associated with the spectrum may be 
considered garbage applications (although, as noted earlier, 
we need to be sure not to classify as garbage valuable 
                                                          
77 This does not mean that willful or intentional misuse 
of an unlicensed device should be free of legal sanctions, 
only that users who use the device in its original 
configuration (as certified) should be able to expect safe 
harbor relief from interference claims.  
78 At the retail level, mobile networks are continuously 
allocating and de-allocating spectrum to support different 
mobile callers. This is relatively easy in a centralized 
network management context. 
applications that fail to generate appropriable or easily 
measured benefits).  
Another option may be to impose clear term limits 
which specify when the spectrum will be reviewed. While 
superficially attractive, such term limits are problematic for 
the efficient working of markets. Term limits may deter 
investment in infrastructure that has an economic life that 
does not match the remaining term of the spectrum. This can 
give rise to a potential hold-up problem when the spectrum 
is up for review, or equivalently, a regulatory commitment 
problem if the policymaker is induced to protect incumbent 
users even against more efficient new uses for the spectrum. 
The problems with de-allocating broadcast television 
spectrum following the conversion to digital broadcasting 
demonstrates that this is a real risk. 
To the extent the radio infrastructure is frequency 
agile, it will be less co-specialized with any particular 
spectrum and so may be able to relocate if the spectrum it 
had been using is de-allocated at the end of the term. While 
this might work in an ideal world, there are likely to be non-
negligible costs associated with migrating to another 
spectrum band. Consequently, most property rights 
advocates oppose term limits for licensed spectrum, 
believing that such limits are unnecessary when there is a 
market.79 For a Commons, however, the market-mechanism 
of simply transferring the exclusive use rights to a new 
licensee for a monetary payment would not work. 
Therefore, a regulatory commitment to review Commons 
usage periodically (i.e., term limits) is likely to be 
important. A clear ex ante commitment to such a policy will 
help reduce any distortionary effects of the term limits for 
unlicensed use. Moreover, at least with respect to ad hoc 
applications, we may be comforted that most of the 
infrastructure is relatively short-lived which means that term 
limits may be less disruptive than they might be in another 
context (e.g., radio systems with lots of capital-intensive, 
long-lived antenna sites).  
3.2.7 Security and Privacy protection  
The final class of rules we expect to be needed are 
ones to address privacy and security concerns. Within a 
Licensed model, it may be possible to centralize 
responsibility protecting security and privacy by assigning 
liability to the licensee. The licensee can, in turn, contract 
with users to implement appropriate approaches. 
In an ad hoc, distributed/decentralized 
environment, protecting security and privacy raises 
additional challenges ([MackCor99]). Ad hoc nodes may be 
especially susceptible to denial of service attacks, spoofing, 
and sniffing that will challenge efforts to generate 
distributed trust models. Also, any use of device identity 
signaling which would simplify enforcement of the 
                                                          
79 For example, Faulhaber ([Faulhab05]) and Hazlett 
([Hazlett01]) oppose term limits, however Baumol 
([Baumol05]) supports the use of term limits. 
protocol, may pose an unacceptable risk for privacy. To 
protect privacy, it will be desirable to limit any signaling to 
the minimal information necessary to implement the sharing 
mechanism (e.g., limit signaling to power, but not device 
identity). In the end, both a secure out-of-band control 
channel (analogous to the signaling channel in Q931 or 
SS7) will be needed as well as the in-band, decentralized 
controls, since the capability and trust in alternative 
distributed privacy mechanisms may take many years to 
develop and deploy. 
Thus, we advocate power control as the primal 
resource concern. We propose a hybrid of a control channel 
(e.g. licensed, protected and secure) as well as decentralized 
control for power, location identity to be expressed, and 
spectrum rights/grant responses. In such a situation, security 
and privacy concerns will be reflected in the users' choice of 
spectrum access. In a more trusting community, a set of 
users may select an ad hoc system dependent on mutual 
interest for good behavior, while in a more  competitive 
context, users may call for a more hardened approach to 
security. Thus, privacy considerations also support a 
diversification of spectrum control mechanisms and policy. 
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
The legacy of command & control (C&C) 
spectrum management regulation has hampered the growth 
of wireless services and the deployment of new 
technologies. A consensus has emerged regarding the 
desirability of reforming spectrum management to rely more 
on market forces. There are two principal models for 
implementing such reform: property 
rights/licensed/exclusive use ("Licensed") and open 
access/unlicensed/commons ("Commons"). This paper 
examines how a Spectrum Commons might be managed 
effectively. 
As wireless traffic become more like Internet 
traffic (heterogeneous, bursty or fat-tailed, long hold time 
for connectivity but variable link status because of ad hoc 
networking), we will need new ways to manage wireless 
resources. The traditional and time-tested hierarchical, 
centralized approaches to network management will need to 
be supplemented with, and in some cases, replaced by more 
distributed/decentralized network management techniques. 
This will require new Protocols both at the level of running 
code (protocols and standards) and at the level of 
institutional frameworks (spectrum management regimes). 
There are two paradigmic approaches to decentralizing 
spectrum management to rely less on centralized regulatory 
authority (so-called, command and control) and more on 
markets: licensed and unlicensed spectrum.  
The Protocols that are needed need to be more 
dynamically adaptive and responsive to local information. 
Following David Reed,80 there needs to be a phase shift in 
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how portions of the RF spectrum are managed: from the 
solid approach of C&C which presumes a lot of long-range 
static order in the wireless ecosystem (predictable link 
quality, demand loads, and routing) to the more liquid 
approach of a commons (ad hoc networks requiring locally 
very dynamic demand and routing adaptation).  
Policy-makers are committing to a dual regime of 
flexible licensed and commons/unlicensed spectrum to 
provide for the evolution from C&C to these more 
decentralized management regimes. While economists well 
understand how an ideal licensed regime based on 
decentralization of residual control over spectrum use (and 
technology choice) to markets (via tradable property rights 
to exclusive use) ought to work, there is less clear 
understanding of how a spectrum commons might work. 
This latter is closer to a barter or social market, than to the 
commodity goods market that best approximates the 
competitive ideal. This paper addresses this gap by focusing 
on the elements for a Protocol for managing a Commons. 
Our analysis suggests a set of design rules, if you 
will, for evaluating alternative technical and institutional 
proposals for creating an appropriate management Protocol 
for a Spectrum Commons. This framework involves a 
characterization of the environment in which we expect the 
Protocol to operate (Table 1A), the characteristics that will 
distinguish a good mechanism (Table 1B), and our 
preliminary thoughts on the kinds of rules that will be 
needed (Table 1C). While much remains to be done to flesh 
out the Commons Protocol, this framework should prove 
useful in evaluating alternative proposals and rules.  
There are multiple pressures on the design space 
for spectrum management. And, there are a number of 
different tools we can bring to bear. From the technical side, 
we have engineering control theory, information theory, 
computer science (complexity, computability, proof 
systems), and mathematics (modeling). From economics, 
political science and legal studies we have the theory of the 
firm and markets, asymmetric information games, 
mechanism design, and institutional theory (common 
resource management, institutional enforcement 
mechanisms, and pricing theory). Since the evaluation of 
Commons regimes will be inherently multidisciplinary, we 
will need to use all of these tools.  
Proposed rules will need to be examined for their 
expected performance with respect to technical efficiency 
(ability to support ad hoc communications with low 
overhead but high QoS), industry efficiency (promote 
competition and innovation), and regulatory efficiency 
(minimize regulatory costs and distortions). Although we 
lack a science of design in such a complex space, we have a 
number of metaphors and design principles (e.g., the end-to-
end principal in Internet architecture, efficiency of 
competitive markets in economics) that allow us to tell 
when one design is better than another for some reasonable 
definition of better (e.g., resilient, futureproof, tussel-space-
compliant, etc.).  
Our design rules lead us to conclude that the 
appropriate Protocols for a Commons will need to be more 
liquid than in the past: (1) Market-based instead of C&C; 
(2) Decentralized/distributed (i.e., including Commons' 
managed spectrum along with Licensed); and, (3) Adaptive 
and flexible (Anonymous, distributed, decentralized, and 
locally responsive).  
 
Table 1A : Past v. Future Environment for Design of Wireless Protocols 
Past Future 
Circuit-switched, voice Packet-switched, data 
Fixed QoS, predictable traffic Variable QoS, unpredictable traffic 
Centralized/hierarchical network management of resource 
sharing 
Decentralized/distributed network management of 
resource sharing 
Spectrum scarce, expensive, narrow frequency bands Spectrum (relatively) abundant, cheap, wider frequency 
bands  
Fixed radio system design (omnidirectional antennas, 
frequency limited, dumb receivers) 
Smart (software) radio systems (steerable antennas, 
frequency agile, adaptive radios) 
Mobile service provider networks Ad hoc mobile wireless networks 
Licensed spectrum (strong interference protection) Unlicensed Commons (weak interference protection) 
 
Table 2B : Goals for a Successful Commons Management Protocol 
Characteristic Rationales and Features 
Promote Innovation • Promote innovation in wireless devices, services, and business models. 
• Complement C&C and flexible licensed  
Minimize spectrum access costs • Minimize entry barriers for new nodes to access spectrum, new 
technologies to be deployed 
• No real-time usage charges for access.  
Provide mechanism for 
congestion management 
• Distributed/decentralized mechanism for managing congestion, 
coordinating usage. 
• "TCP" friendly techniques 
Provide mechanism for 
modifying/establishing etiquette 
• No tradable licenses to allow market mediation of changing of technical 
protocol 
• Need structured process (industry standardization) to mediate change. 
Promote fairness and non-
discriminatory access 
• Promote open access. 
• Distributed/decentralized is inherently fair.  
Minimalist regulation • Decentralize to market forces. 
• As minimal regulatory constraints as necessary to provide structure. 
• Technology, business model neutral 
 
 
 
Table 1C : Taxonomy of Rules for Management of Spectrum Commons 
Rule Rationales and Features 
No transmit only 
devices, no protection 
for receive only 
• Transmitters need to be able to receive to provide feedback loop. 
• Receive-only devices should have no interference protection rights since in 
decentralized management regime, they have no way to signal their presence. 
Power  • Single most important design constraint for radio systems 
• Power rules should anticipate multihop use. 
• Limits on individual device power and some sort of interference temperature limits 
(aggregate flux) likely to be needed. 
Signalling • Need signaling capability to share global information 
• Should be provision to support common channel signaling 
• Will aid in supporting cooperation and enforcement 
• Will aid in making spectrum preemptible. 
Contention • Specify "contention" manners instead of specific protocol.  
• "TCP-friendly" fair queuing approach seems desirable. 
• Consistent with ECN approach recommended for Internet. 
Enforcement • Protocol should be designed to support incentive compatible cooperation, which 
includes mechanisms to support enforcement 
• Legal sanctions and other external institutional frameworks will complement and help 
support enforcement. 
• Software radio certification rules will be key element 
• Liability rules will be central feature. 
Reversibility • Mechanisms will be needed to support de-allocation of commons spectrum both in 
short term and long term. 
• Preemptibility function will aid short-term reallocation 
• Long-term reallocation may require term limits for regulatory review of Commons 
spectrum. 
Security/Privacy • Protecting security and privacy will be critical, and ad hoc networks raise additional 
challenges. 
• Decentralized privacy mechanisms are needed. 
• Also, will likely need secure out-of-band control channel. 
• Signaling of device information should be minimal, perhaps limited to power usage 
aspects to protect privacy 
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